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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, _nst_uctions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. .....
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Rudder/Speed
Brake (RSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and poten-
tial critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then
compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline along with the proposed
Post 51-L CIL updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy
from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as
required. This report documents the results of that comparison
for the Orbiter RSB hardware.
The IOA product for the RSB analysis consisted of thirty-eight
failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in twenty-seven potential
critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA
baseline (as of 7 December 1987) which consisted of (Note i)
thirty-four FMEAs and eighteen CIL items. The comparison
determined if there were any results which had been found by the
IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced
agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all
non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement. Based on discussions with
the NASA subsystem manager, no additional non-CIL FMEAs are
anticipated for the past 51-L update. Figure 1 presents a
comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline, and any issues.
Note i. The comparison of NASA FMEA Non-CIL items is based on
the Pre 51-L baseline since all Post 51-L FMEAs have not been
received as the date of this report.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older ground
rules document which has since been superseded by the NSTS 22206
used by the IOA. After comparison, there were no discrepancies
found that were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining
issues may be attributed to differences in ground rules.
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Figure 1 - RSB FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS office has
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 _nalysls Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0
2.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
Resolve differences
Review in-house
Document assessment issues
Forward findings to Project Manager
Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B. There were no subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions used in this analysis.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Subsystem consists of that ,
hardware required to provide both directional and energy control
of the Orbiter during entry. The RSB subsystem consists of the
following components.
. A PDU is made up of two halves which are identical in
makeup and operation: one for rudder and one for
speedbrake. A switching valve determines which of the
three Orbiter hydraulic systems supplies the PDU
electro-hydraulic Servo VLV (E-H Servo VLV). There are
eight E-H Servo VLVs: four in each PDU half. Each half
of the PDU is controlled by four E-H Servo VLVs which
receive commands from four Aerosurface Amplifiers/Flight
Control System (ASA/FCS) channels.
Each E-H Servo VLV receives from its ASA a position
error command which it changes to a hydraulic pressure
command. This is ported to a triplex power valve where
the pressure (secondary Delta P) along with pressures
from the three other E-H Servo VLVs command two valves
that control pressure to three hydraulic motor/brake
assemblies. These motors are used to drive a
differential gearbox which sums all three motor torques
and outputs it to a single drive shaft. The shaft is
connected to a mixer gearbox. The mixer gearbox takes
the drive shaft inputs from both the rudder and
speedbrake channels, mixes them, and outputs them to a
set of four rotary actuators which move the vertical
panels. When the output shafts rotate in the same
direction, the two panels move in the same direction
thus providing rudder control. When the output shafts
rotate in the opposite direction, the two panels move in
Opposite direction thus acting as a speedbrake.
For each E-H Servo VLV there is an isolation valve which
will isolate a failed E-H Servo VLV when its secondary
delta P fails the ASA fault detection limits. The
isolation valve can be commanded from the ASA, a crew
keyboard input or an FCS switch taken to off. The crew
can also inhibit an ASA isolation valve command by
placing a FCS switch in the ORIDE position. If a
problem develops within an E-H Servo VLV or its
commanded position is different than the others,
secondary delta P should begin to rise. Each channel
has a secondary delta P transducer (LVDT) which sends
Delta P to the ASA. Once the ASA detects secondary
delta P at or above 2200 PSI for more than 120 msec, it
will send an isolation command to the appropriate
isolation valve which bypasses hydraulic pressure to the
E-H Servo VLV causing its commanded pressure to the
power spool to drop to zero.
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Position from the Rotary Variable Differential
Transformer (RVDT) on the differential gearbox are sent
to the ASA and to the crew displays. Position is not
used by the ASA for failure detection; it is used only
to modify (negative feedback) the position command
generated by the General Purpose Computer (GPC). The
following is a list of the components of the PDU which
were reviewed and analyzed for failure modes.
a. Switching Valve
b. Standby Hydraulic Circulation Valve
c. E-H Servo VLV
d. E-H Servo VLV Filter
e. Bypass Valve
f. Secondary Delta P Transducer
g. Triplex Power Valve
h. Hydraulic Motor/Brake Assembly
i. Differential Gearbox
j. Position Transducer
k. Mixer Gearbox
3.2
2. There are four geared rotary actuators which drive the
two aerosurface panels. Commands from the PDU mixer
gearbox are transmitted via two shaft outputs to the two
columns of aluminum drive shafts connecting the four
rotary actuators. Internal gears pick up the drive
shaft inputs and move the brackets that contain the
aerosurface fastening points. The Orbiter fastening
points are fixed, attached to Orbiter structure. Each
rotary actuator is made up of two driver gear
assemblies, a series of satellite gear assemblies, and
two center drum assemblies which drive independently of
each other. Driveshaft rotations in the same direction
will turn the center drums and therefore the aerosurface
fastening in the same direction (rudder control).
Driveshaft rotations in the opposite directions drive
the center drums in opposite directions (speedbrake
control).
Interfaces and Locations
The RSB interfaces with the four ASAs which receive commands via
four FA MDM's from the four GPCs. Crew initiated inputs; Rudder
Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA), Speedbrake Translation
Controller (SBTC), and Rotation Hand Controller (RHC), are
inputted to the GPCs. The crew can turn power on or off to any
ASA channel, can place a FCS channel switch in ORIDE which
bypasses the ASA fault detection circuitry, and send bypass
inhibit commands to the ASA via keyboard entry.
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The RSB actuation mechanism is physically located in the vertical
stabilizer. The ASAs which provide position commands to the
actuators are located in avionics bays 4, 5, and 6. The Surface
Position Indicator (SPI) provides a gauge type display for the
crew to check aerosurface position. It is located between
Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTs) i and 2 on panel F7. The following CRT
displays are available to the crew: GNC System Summary 1 (PASS
and BFS), Spec 53 Entry Control Display, FCS Dedicated Display
Checkout (during OPS 8) and the Caution and Warning (Panel F7)
(FCS Saturation, FCS Channel and Backup C/W Alarm). The two sets
of switches which provide crew inputs to the actuator ASA system
are the FCS channel monitor switches on Panel C-3 and the ASA
power switches on Panels 014, 015, and 016.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 shows the RSB PDU block diagram. Figures 3 through 9
show individual components which were analyzed for failure modes.
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Figure 2 - RSB PDU BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Figure 3 - HYDRAULIC VALVE MODULE
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Figure 6 - SWITCHING VALVE
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Figure 8 - RSB AND BF TORQUE TUBE CONFIGURATION
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Figure 9 - ROTARY ACTUATOR CUT AWAY
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the RSB hardware initially generated thirty-
eight failure mode worksheets and identified twenty-seven
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed
NASA Post 51-L baseline (20 May 1987) of (Note I) thirty-four
FMEAs and twenty CIL items, and the updated (7 December 1987)
version of (Note i) thirty-four FMEAs and eighteen CIL items.
The discrepancy between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be
explained by the different approach used by NASA and IOA to group
failure modes. Upon completion of the assessment and after
discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, an agreement between
the NASA FMEA/CIL items and the IOA failure modes was reached.
Note i. Have received Post 51-L items only. Have not received
all the Post 51-L NASA FMEAs as of the date of this request.
Non-CIL items comparison was based on review of NASA Pre 51-L
baseline and IOA correlation and analysis.
In the following, the unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failure modes after they have been mapped into the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to be
mapped onto NASA FMEA.
RSB IOA IOA
Elements Unmapped Mapped NASA Issues
PDU 36 32 32 0
Rotary Actuator 1 1 1 0
Drive Shaft 1 1 1 0
38 34 34 0
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure modes identified assessed. Appendix D highlights to the
NASA critical items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in STS Engineering and Operations
Support (STSEOS) Working Paper I.O-SP-VA86001-04, Analysis of the
RSB, 3 December 1986. No supplemental analysis worksheets were
generated for the RSB assessment. Appendix F provides a cross-
reference between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheets.
IOA recommendations are also summarized.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
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Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
Component NASA IOA Issues
7 7 0o PDU
PDU Elements
o Switch Valve
o Recirculation Valve
o EH Servovalve
o By-Pass Valve
o Filter
o Secondary Delta P
X-DCER
o Power Valve
o Motor/Brake
o Differential Gearbox
o Position X-DCER
o Mixer Gearbox
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shaft
4
2
2
1
2
1
1
5
4
2
1
1
1
4
2
2
1
2
1
1
5
4
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL 34 34 0
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component NASA IOA Issues
2 2 0o PDU
PDU Elements
o Switch Valve
o Recirculation Valve
o EH Servovalve
o By-Pass Valve
o Filter
o Secondary Delta P
X-DCER
o Power Valve
o Motor/Brake
o Differential Gearbox
o Position X-DCER
o Mixer Gearbox
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shaft
1
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1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL 18 18 0
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Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
I
TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality: TOTAL
o PDU
PDU Elements
o Switch Valve
o Recirculation Valve
o EH Servovalve
o By-Pass Valve
o Filter
o Sec. Delta P X-DCER
o Power Valve
o Motor/Brake
o Differential
Gearbox
o Position X-DCER
o Mixer Gearbox
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shaft
TOTAL
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Of the failure modes analyzed, eighteen were determined to be
critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items
is presented in Table IV.
TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality: TOTAL
= =
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o PDU
PDU Elements
o Switch Valve
o Recirculation Valve
o EH Servovalve
o By-Pass Valve
o Filter
o Sec. Delta P X-DCER
o Power Valve
o Motor/Brake
o Differential
Gearbox
o Position X-DCER
o Mixer Gearbox
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shaft
TOTAL
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
u
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z
Component
o PDU
o Hydraulic
Valve Module
o Hydraulic
Motor/Brake
o Differential
Gearbox
o Mixer Gearbox
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shaft
Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers
IOA ID Number
RSB-101 thru RSB-103; RSB-106 thru RSB-109,
RSB-104, 105, RSB-110 thru RSB-123
RSB-124 thru RSB-128
RSB-129 thru RSB-i34; RSB-138
RSB-135
RSB-136
RSB-137
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4.1 PDU Assessment" Results
Failures which were related to the PDU as an entity were
analyzed. Critical failures resulting in loss of vehicle/crew
were associated with gross loss of hydraulic fluid due to
complete seal failure, rupture of servoactuator in and downstream
of the switching valve (manifold, return lines, LEE plugs) and
hydraulic supply line rupture (one system). These failures
result in depletion of all three hydraulic supplies.
Non-critical failures were associated with internal components
which leaked hydraulic fluid. These leaks are contained within
the PDU and do not cause depletion of the hydraulic system
supplies. Other failures which were not critical were associated
with the PDU heater blankets which are considered redundant.
4.2 PDU Elements
Components which make up the PDU were individually analyzed. In
most cases, failures were included under one common assessment
when the failures of a component had the same effect on the
system operation. Those component failures which were analyzed
separately and had the system effect were correlated with the
NASA FMEA/CIL which combined like failures. Criticality 1
failures were associated with contamination of hydraulic fluid
which clogged filters and caused jamming of the hydraulic power
valve spool. Both failures result in loss of the RSB function.
Mechanical failures (sheared shaft/spline or damaged barrel/valve
plate) of the hydraulic motor/brake assembly resulted in
criticality I failures resulting in loss of the RSB function.
Mechanical failures also result in loss of the differential and
mixer gearboxes causing loss of the RSB function. The failures
were caused by fractures of gear shafts, splines or gears and
seized bearings. The failure of the position transducer assembly
(four transducers ganged together) also results in loss of the
RSB function. A mechanical failure in the transducer drive train
will result in loss of all four position transducers.
In summary, criticality I failures were due to i) hydraulic
contamination and 2) mechanical failures in gear drive trains.
4.3 Rotary Actuators
Analysis of the rotary actuators which provide the torque
required to move the RSB surfaces showed that either an open
(gear shaft spline sheared, gear teeth broken) or a jam (seized
gear or bearing, overload resulted in the loss of an actuator.
loss of any one of the four actuators would result in overloading
the remaining actuators causing them to fail with the resultant
loss of the RSB function hence loss of vehicle control.
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The ten drive shafts transmit RPM/torque between the PDU and the
rotary actuators. Critical failures of the shafts were fractures
and gears shearing from the shaft spline. Three failures result
in loss of drive to or between the four rotary actuators with
resultant loss of RSB control.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NST$ 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
_NTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
- begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - beg_nsat declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, p0st-fiight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CQNTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY M_SSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE _MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
M_SSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW _ROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
z
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
_FTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
i
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
PIeDaration of _EA/CIL, i0 October l-gS_, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions ....
U
I
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The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed tobe
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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RSB Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly
level of the RSB subsystem. The analysis considered the
worst case effects of the hardware or functional failure on
the subsystem, and crew and vehicle safety.
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DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the Assessment of the Rudder/Speed Brake Subsystem. The
information on these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the
NASA FMEA/CIL (Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis
worksheets included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets
identifies the NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC
Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality,
redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each failure mode,
the highest assessed hardware and functional criticality is
compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the compare row under
the column where the discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
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Hardware Criticalities:
1 _ Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
- NASA FMEA/CIL
- Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X _ Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N - Non compare for that column (deviation)
u
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-101
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: I01
ITEM: POWER DRIVE UNIT (PDU)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-102
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011100-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
_B
102
_WER DRIVE UNIT (PDU)
_AD ANALYST: R. WI_ON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _D_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
_COMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONA_: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_MARKS:
NO ISSUE. _SS OF HYD_ULIC P_SS_ TO ONE MOTOR/BRA_ ASSEMBLY
_SULTS IN THE OTHER _0 MOTORS BACKDRIVING THE FAIreD MOTOR
RESULTING A COMPT._TE TORQUE SPILLANT THUS _SING THE RSB
_NCTION.
m
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-103
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
103
POWER DRIVE UNIT (PDU)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] [N] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
i
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH NASA. INTERNAL LEAK IS CONTAINED WILL NOT DEPLETE
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM SUPPLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-104
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE IS CONSIDERED TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. NO KNOWN
CONDITIONS COULD EXIST WHICH WOULD RUPTURE THE FILTER - NASA PRE-
BOARD REVIEW, CHANGE CRITICALITY TO 3/3. NO ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-5
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n
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
RSB-105
02-4C-011102-2
RSB
105
FILTER
R. WILSON
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
i
mm
mBJ
B
I
I
I
mm
i
g
E
mm
g
I
m
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-6
U
l
mz
w
m
i
w
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-106
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011118-01
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 106
ITEM: HEATER BLANKET
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
J
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-107
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011118-02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 107
ITEM: HEATER BLANKET
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:-
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-108
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011118-03
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: HEATER BLANKET
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY_SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS Q
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
E ,
U
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-109
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011118-04
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 109
ITEM: HEATER BLANKET
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
C ] C ] C ] C ]
w
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RECOMMENDATIONS".
[ / ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
D
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-II0
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011101-I
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: II0
ITEM: SWITCH VALVE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ NA]
[P]
[N]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE. CONCUR WITH NASA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ix]
[ ]
E
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENTID: RSB-III
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011iXX-X
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: iii
ITEM: SWITCH VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CP] [P]
[P] [P]
C ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
CP]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
mm
D
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE PRIMARY VALVE FAILS TO SWITCH TO STANDBY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
ON LOSS OF THE PRIMARY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, VALVE 2 WILL SWITCH TO
STANDBY 2 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. A LOSS OF PRESSURE FROM STANDBY 2
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
TO THE SERVOVALVES WHICH RESULTS IN LOSS OF RSB CONTROL. THE
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THIS FAILURE TO HAVE A 2/IR
CRITICALITY. HOWEVER, AS THE RESULT OF FURTHER ANALYSIS DURING
THE ASSESSMENT PERIOD THE FAILURE CRITICALITY CAN BE DOWNGRADED
TO 3/IR. THIS FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED AND REQUIRES THREE
FAILURES BEFORE THERE IS ANY EFFECT ON THE ACTUATOR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-II2
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011101-2
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 112
ITEM: SWITCH VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-II3
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011101-3
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 113
ITEM: SWITCH VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
B
D
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-II4
"NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 114
ITEM: HYDRAULIC VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA INCLUDEDS THIS FAILURE AMONT OTHERS HAVING THE SAME EFFECT
IN ONE FMEA. IOA CONSID_D AS ASEP_TE MODE STNCE EACH
FAILURE WAS CONSIDERED SEPARATELY. NO DISAGREEMENT OR ISSUE.
MDAC-II7, MDAC-II5, AND MDAC-II8 ARE INCLUDED IN THE NASA/RI
FMEA. AGREE WITH CRITICALITY, REMAINING THREE CHANNELS ARE
UTILIZED FOR FLIGHT CONTROL. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER
THREE FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-15
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-II5
NASA FMEA #: 01-4C-011104-I
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 115
ITEM: HYDRAULIC VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
IF]
[P]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
n
mm
mS
I
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 02-4C-011104-I (MDAC ID 114) CONSIDERED FAILING TO MOVE
VALVE FROM NULL WHEN COMMANDED. AFTER THE VALVE HAS MOVED TO A
COMMANDED POSITION, FAILURE TO RETURN TO NULL IS CONSIDERED TO BE
A POSSIBLE FAILURE, HOWEVER BOTH FAILURES CAUSE THE SAME
EFFE_. AGUE=TO COMBINING_DER 0NE FMEA/CIL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-II6
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011104-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 116
ITEM: HYDRAULIC VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA. NO ISSUE.
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENTID: RSB-I17
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011104-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
117
TORQUEMOTORASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
R. WILSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA INCLUDES THIS FAILURE AMONG OTHER HAVING THE SAME EFFECT
UNDER 02-4C-011104-I. MDAC IOA CONSIDERED AS A SEPARATE FAILURE
MODE SINCE EACH COMPONENT WAS ANALYZED SEPARATELY. NO
DISAGREEMENT OR CONFLICT WITH NASA. INCLUDE AS A FAILURE UNDER
MDAC- 114. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-II8
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
i18
TORQUE MOTOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA INCLUDES THIS FAIL=URE AMONG OTHERS HAVING THE_ SAME EFFECT
UNDER 02-4C-0!!I04-I. MDAC IOA CONSIDERED AS A SEPARATE FAILURE
MODE SINCE EACH COMPONENT WAS ANALYZED SEP_TELY. NO
DISAGREEMENT OR CONFLICT WITH NASA. INCLUDE AS A FAILURE UNDER
MDAC- 114. NO ISSUE.
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-II9
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011104-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
119
SECONDARY DELTA P TRANSDUCER (4R, 4SB)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[P]
[ F ]
IN]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
Ix]
[ N ]
D
mm
m
ms
mm
m
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE THAT FAILURE IS DETECTABLE. THREE REMAINING TRANSDUCERS
PROVIDE ADEQU-ATE FEEDBACK TO _SA.: T_S T_EPAILURES TO _SE
LOSS OF CONTROL FUNCTIONS.
NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-120
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011104-X
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 120
ITEM: ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-121
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011119-01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
121
RECIRCULATION VALVE (IR, ISB)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
I
mm
m
mm
mm
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-122
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011119-02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
122
RECIRCULATION VALVE (IR, ISB)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
iADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
m
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-123
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011106-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 123
ITEM: TRIPLEX POWER VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
mm
I
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m
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b
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-124
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011108-2
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 124
ITEM: HYDRAULIC MOTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC A B
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
w
W
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
i
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ASSESS_NT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-125
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011108-I
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 125
ITEM: HYDRAULIC MOTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
g
11
U
mm
g
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
NASA CONSIDERS THISFAILURE TO HAVE A 3/3 CRITICALITY SINCE
THE MOTOR IS STILL FUNCTIONALLY OPERATIONAL EVEN AT REDUCED RATE.
THERE IS NO WAY THAT ANY LEAKAGE COULD OCCUR THAT WOULD DEGRADE
THE MOTOR OUTPUT TO THE POINT THAT IT COULD BE BACK
DRIVEN THROUGH THE DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX BY THE OTHER TWO MOTORS.
BAS+E_N__ssIONSWiT_+T_++_SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, THERE IS
AGREEMENT THAT THERE IS NO FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY FOR THIS
FAILURE MODE. CRITICALITY BECOMES 3/3.
NO ISSUE.
g
!
I
HI
i
i
ms
m
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-26
z
m
l
mm
iw
i
I
z
i
i
i
i
i
i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-126
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 126
ITEM: HYDRAULIC BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
: z
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENTID: RSB-127
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011110-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 127
ITEM: HYDRAULIC BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
(If different from NASA)
] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-128
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011110-I
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 128
ITEM: HYDRAULIC BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ i /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
w
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m
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-129
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
129
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA ALSO COVERS MDAC-130. NO DISAGREEMENT WITH COMBINING
THESE FAILURE MODES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-130
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
130
SUMMER DIFFERENTIALGEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS COVERED UNDER ONE FMEA/CIL (MDAC-129). NO
DISAGREEMENT WITH COMBINING FAILURES UNDER ONE FMEA/CIL.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-131
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011112-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [_ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
131
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[. / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-132
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011112-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
132
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST" R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] E ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA CRIT, AND ALSO THAT FAILURE PASSES SCREEN B.
ISSUE.
NO
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-133
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011114-2
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 133
ITEM: POSITION TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
m
z
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-134
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011114-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 134
ITEM: POSITION TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT THE CRITICALITY IS 3/IR AND PASSES B
REDUNDANCY SCREEN. THE INITIAL IOA WAS BASED ON ASSUMING THAT
THE ASA ELECTRONICS WOULD NOT DETECT THE FAILURE WHEN COMMANDING
AT OR NEAR THE NULL POSITION. POSITION DATA IS NOT USED IN THE
ASA AND IS READILY DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-135
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011116-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 135
ITEM: MIXER GEARBOX (I)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
IX]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-136
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011300-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ i /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
RSB
136
GEAR ROTARY ACTUATOR (4)
R. WILSON
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[x]
[ ]
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z
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
AssESSMENT ID: RSB-137
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011200-I
SUBSYSTEM: RSB
MDAC ID: 137
ITEM: DRIVE SHAFTS
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_mC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
_-_ASELINE [ ] _ -
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RSB-138
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-011112-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RSB
138
DIFFERENTIAL GEAR BOX
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AT THE NASA PRE-BOARD REVIEW, THIS WAS TO BE ADDED TO A FMEA/CIL.
ACCEPTED BY PRE-BOARD. NO DISAGREEMENT OR CONFLICT.
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
L
1
1
02-4C-011100-i
02-4C-011100-3
02-4C-011102-2
02-4C-011101-I
02-4C-011104-i
01-4C-011104-I
02-4C-011104-3
02-4C-011104-I
02-4C-011104-i
02-4C-011106-I
02-4C-011108-2
02-4C-011110-2
02-4C-011110-3
02-4C-011110-I
02-4C-011112-I
02-4C-011112-I
02-4C-011112-2
02-4C-011114-2
02-4C-011116-I
02-4C-011300-i
02-4C-011200-I
02-4C-011112-5
i01
102
105
ii0
114
115
116
117
118
123
124
126
127
128
129
130
131
133
135
136
137
138
PDU
PDU
FILTER
SWITCH VALVE
EH SERVOVALVE
EH SERVOVALVE
EH SERVOVALVE
EH SERVOVALVE
EH SERVOVALVE
POWER VALVE
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL
SUMMER DIFFE_NTIAL
POSITION TRANSDUCER
MIXER GEARBOX
ROTARY ACTUATOR
DRIVE SHAFTS
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL
D-I
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
COMPONENT RUPTURE;
GROSS FLUID
LOSS 3 SYSTEMS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE,
LINE RUPTURE;
GROSS FLUID
LOSS 1 SYSTEM
CLOGGED
SECONDARY VALVE
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS AT NULL
UNDETECTED BY ASA
FAILS TO RETURN TO
NULL - UNDETECTED
BY ASA
NO ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
TORQUE MOTOR FAIL
UNDETECTED BY ASA
FLAPPER VALVE FAIL
UNDETECTED BY ASA
FAI_, DRIVE OPEN/
DRIVE CLOSED
NO RPM/TORQUE OUTPUT,
OPEN DRIVELINE
FAILS TO BRAKE
FAILS TO RELEASE
OPEN DRIVELINE
OPEN OR PARTIAL
JAMMED DRIVELINE
OUTPUT JAMMED -
2ND STAGE
PARTIAL JAM -
SINGLE DIFFERENTIAL
GEAR MESH JAM
FAIL ALL FOUR;
LOSS OF MECHANICAL
INPUT, ELECTRICAL
OUTPUT
OPEN, JAMMED ONE OR
BOTH SHAFTS
JAMMED, OPEN
DRIVELINE
OPEN OR JAMMED SHAFT
IST DIFFERENTIAL
SHAFT OPEN -
IST STAGE
I_I
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APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
04, Analysis of the RSB, (3 December 1986). Prior results
were obtained independently and documented before starting the
FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was
performed to address failure modes not previously considered by
the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed,
parent assembly and function performed. For each failure mode
possible causes are identified, and hardware and functional
criticality for each mission phase are determined as described in
NSTS _2_Q6, _nstructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0
October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the bottom
of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at the
top. There were no supplemental analysis worsheets, generated
for the RSB.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
w
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE
w
w
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E. The
Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA number, IOA assessment Number,
NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Resolution/Issue/Rational Codes
Code
i.
Definition
IOA concurs - NASA CCB considers this a non-credible
failure - delete.
All other initial IOA criticality and redundancy screen
differences were resolved with the NASA subsystem
manager. In addition, the combining of like failures
under one FMEA were agreed to.
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